Acknowledgment	6
	Contents	7
	Contributors	9
	Introduction	13
	Part I Philosophy of Physics	22
	1 Are There Good Arguments Against Scientific Realism?	23
	1.1 Introduction	24
	1.2 Levels of Philosophical Radicality	26
	1.3 The Miracle Argument	29
	1.4 Selective Realism	35
	1.5 Conclusion	40
	References	41
	2 Quantum Gravity: A Dogma of Unification?	43
	2.1 Introduction	43
	2.2 Some Remarks on Quantum Gravity	44
	2.3 The Canonical Picture of General Relativity	47
	2.4 Weinberg's Conception of General Relativity	50
	2.5 Deriving the Principle of Equivalence	51
	2.6 What Do We Learn from This?	55
	2.7 Critical Remarks	57
	2.8 Unification Revisited	58
	References	59
	3 On Predictions and Explanations in Multiverse Scenarios	62
	3.1 Introduction	62
	3.2 String Theory and the Landscape	63
	3.3 On Fine-Tuning and the Anthropic Principle	65
	3.4 Criteria for Scientifically Respectable Multiverse Theories	68
	3.5 Summary and Conclusions	71
	References	72
	4 The Clock Paradox: Luise Lange's Discussion	74
	4.1 The Clock Paradox: Luise Lange's Solution and Its Context	74
	4.2 Two Incorrect Solutions	78
	4.3 Conclusion	79
	References	80
	Part II Philosophy of Life Sciences	81
	5 Bio-Agency and the Possibility of Artificial Agents	82
	5.1 Introduction	82
	5.2 The Systems Biological Criticism of Embodied Robotics	86
	5.2.1 The Emancipation of Agency from Metabolism	86
	5.2.2 No Agency Without Metabolism	88
	5.3 No Agency Without Metabolism?	90
	5.3.1 A Fundamental Difference	90
	5.3.2 The Wrong Matter?	91
	5.3.3 Metabolism, Intrinsic Normativity and Agency	98
	5.4 Conclusions	104
	References	108
	6 When Mechanisms Are Not Enough: The Origin of Eukaryotes and Scientific Explanation	111
	6.1 Introduction	112
	6.2 Symbiosis Theories of the Origin of Eukaryotic Cells	113
	6.3 Mechanistic Explanation	116
	6.4 Symbiogenesis as a Nomological-Expectable Explanation of the Origin of the Eukaryotic Cell	121
	6.5 Concluding Remarks	128
	References	129
	7 Functions, Malfunctioning, and Negative Causation	132
	7.1 Introduction	133
	7.2 Desiderata for a Theory of Functions	134
	7.3 Varieties of Malfunctioning	136
	7.4 Malfunctions and Malfunctionings	138
	7.5 Are Functions Dispositions?	140
	7.5.1 Are All Dispositions Functions?	140
	7.5.2 Are All Functions Dispositions?	141
	7.6 Possible Strategies for Special-Disposition Accounts	142
	7.7 Non-optionality: Why Functions Are Essential	144
	7.8 Causal Efficacy: A Dilemma and a Way Out	146
	7.9 Conclusion	148
	References	149
	8 Disease Entities, Negative Causes, Multifactoriality, and the Naturalness of Disease Classifications. Remarks on Some Philosophical Misperceptions of Medical Pathology	151
	8.1 Introduction	152
	8.2 The Concept of Disease Entity in Medicine	152
	8.2.1 Prehistory of the Concept	152
	8.2.2 The Modern Concept	153
	8.2.2.1 The Concept of Etiological Factors	154
	8.2.2.2 Physiological Laws and Disease Entities	155
	8.2.2.3 Disease Entities and Medical Textbooks	156
	8.2.2.4 Disease Entities and Individual Sickness	157
	8.3 Disease Entities in Philosophy of Medicine	157
	8.3.1 H. Tristram Engelhardt's Misguided Interpretation of Disease Entities	158
	8.3.2 Caroline Whitbeck's Misrepresentation of Disease Entities	159
	8.3.2.1 Whitbeck's Argument Against Objectivity of Etiological Factors	161
	8.3.2.2 Whitbeck's Argument Against the Uniqueness and Unambiguousness of Etiological Factors	162
	8.3.2.3 Whitbeck's Argument Against the Naturalness of Disease Classifications	163
	8.4 Epilogue	164
	References	165
	Part III Philosophy of Social Sciences and Values in Science	167
	9 Identifying Agnotological Ploys: How to Stay Clear of Unjustified Dissent	168
	9.1 Delineating Agnotological Endeavors	168
	9.2 Characterizing Agnotological Maneuvers	171
	9.3 The Impact Centered Approach: Agnotology as the Shift of Inductive Risks	173
	9.4 Agnotology and False Advertising	174
	9.5 Generalizing the False Advertising Account	175
	9.6 Identifying and Coping with Agnotological Machinations	179
	9.7 Conclusion	181
	References	181
	10 The “Ought”-Dimension in Value Theory: The Concept of the Desirable in John Dewey's Definition of Value and Its Significance for the Social Sciences	183
	10.1 Introduction	184
	10.2 The Invention of the “Desirable”: John Dewey	185
	10.3 The Definition of Value for the Social Science: Clyde Kluckhohn	189
	10.4 The Convergence of the “Desirable” and the “Important”: Social Psychology	191
	10.5 Conclusion: The Normative Aspect of Desirability	193
	References	196
	11 From Stability to Validity: How Standards Serve Epistemic Ends	198
	11.1 Introduction	198
	11.2 What Are Standards?	199
	11.3 How Do Standards Relate to Ends?	200
	11.3.1 Stability as Epistemic End of Standardisation	201
	11.3.2 Homogeneity as Epistemic End of Standardisation	203
	11.3.3 Internal Validity as Epistemic End of Standardisation	207
	11.4 Is There an Epistemic Gain of Standardisation?	209
	11.5 Conclusions	210
	References	211
	Part IV Philosophy of Mathematics and Formal Modeling	213
	12 Constitutive Inference and the Problem of a Complete Variation of Factors	214
	12.1 Introduction	214
	12.2 Explanation in Neuroscience	216
	12.3 Regularity Constitution	217
	12.4 Constitutive Inference	220
	12.5 The Problem of a Full Variation of Factors	224
	12.6 Conclusion	228
	References	229
	13 A Partial Calculus for Dag Prawitz's Theory of Grounds and a Decidability Issue	231
	13.1 Introduction	231
	13.2 Prawitz on BHK Proofs in 1977	232
	13.3 The Theory of Grounds	234
	13.3.1 Context	234
	13.3.2 Grounds and Their Language	236
	13.3.3 Valid Inferences and a Decidability Issue	246
	13.4 General and Specific Decidability	247
	13.5 Concluding Remarks	250
	References	251
	14 Models in Search of Targets: Exploratory Modelling and the Case of Turing Patterns	253
	14.1 Introduction	253
	14.2 Exploration, Heuristics, and the (Im)possibility of `Theory-Free' Science	255
	14.3 Functions and Uses of Exploratory Models	260
	14.4 The Case of Reaction-Diffusion Models for Biological Pattern Formation	266
	14.5 Conclusion	275
	References	276
	Author Index	278
	Subject Index	280