Preface	6
	Contents	8
	1 Introduction	10
	2 The Model and a General Existence Result	19
	2.1 Preliminaries	20
	2.2 Interaction, Fitness and Individual Preferences	25
	2.3 Matching Process and Evolutionary Fitness	30
	2.4 Stability Concept and E.cient Strategies	33
	2.5 A General Existence Result for Stable Populations	37
	3 Examples: Properties of the Model	38
	3.1 The ‘Classic’ Prisoner’s Dilemma	38
	3.2 Coordination Games	40
	3.3 Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory	41
	4 Evolutionary Extinction of Expected Utility Preferences	44
	4.1 A Disfavor Result for Expected Utility Preferences	45
	4.2 Potential Stable Populations	46
	4.3 An Anti-Coordination Game	48
	5 Evolution with More Sophisticated Types	54
	5.1 The Restricted Type Space	55
	5.2 Existence in the 2 × 2 Case	60
	6 A Model with Two Populations	65
	6.1 Two-Population Stability	66
	6.2 An Outlook with Some Illustrative Examples	69
	6.3 Asymmetric Contests	78
	7 Conclusions	80
	A Proofs for Chapter 2	83
	A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.21	83
	A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.22	87
	B Proofs for Chapter 4	90
	B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1	90
	B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2	96
	C Proofs for Chapter 5	104
	C.1 Proof of Proposition 5.11	104
	C.2 Proof of Theorem 5.12	107
	C.3 Proof of Lemma 5.13	108
	C.4 Proof of Lemma 5.14	110
	C.5 Proof of Lemma 5.16	114
	References	130