Contents	7
	Preface	10
	Acknowledgments	12
	General Introduction	14
	Part I.Procedural foundationalism	23
	1.Introduction to part I	25
	2.Program and scope	28
	3.Reductionism, confirmation holism, theoretical deductivism	42
	4.Some observations on reductionism and the “autonomy” of the special sciences	49
	5.Some comments on the philosophical implications of the use of idealizations in science	59
	6.Gross regularities	73
	7.Procedures and perceptual procedures	81
	8.Shedding perceptual procedures	87
	9.Conclusion to part I	91
	Part II. Two-tiered coherentism	94
	1.Introduction to part II	96
	2.Evidential centrality	98
	3.Ob-similar extensions and ob*-similar extensions	105
	4.Ob-similarity, observational regularities, reasons for incommensurability	114
	5.Kuhnian considerations and the accumulation of knowledge	119
	6.Perceptual impermeability and biotechnical incommensurability	125
	7.Methodological observations about epistemology, scepticism and truth	129
	Part III.Permuting reference	144
	1.Introduction to part III	146
	2.Formal considerations	149
	3.Quine’s version	153
	4.Field’s version	165
	5.Putnam’s version	168
	6.The ontological status of causality	175
	7.Some puzzles about reference	182
	8.Conclusion to part III	188
	Part IV. The transcendence of reference	191
	1.Introduction to part IV	193
	2.Troubles for naive naturalism	196
	3.The elusivity of reference	206
	4.Causality and reference: an analysis	218
	5.Transcending procedures	225
	6.Transcendence and its discontents	236
	General conclusion	243
	Bibliography	246
	Index	258
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